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Equal access to health care has become one of the fundamental public policy flashpoints 
of our time. One basic challenge in this area is to find explanations for the decline in 
access across the general population. There is a broad level of popular dissatisfaction 
with the provision of health care in this county, as the number uninsured individuals 
continues to rise apace no matter what stopgap measures are applied to stem the flow. On 
this point, I have no reason or desire to defend the current system of health care delivery 
in the United States against all its critics, insofar as regulations now in place create a 
bewildering set of subsidies and sanctions that reduce the ability of voluntary market 
transactions to respond to health care needs of both consumers and health care providers. 
Here is one short explanation. The level of access depends on the type of coverage that is 
offered. In recent years, states have imposed mandates on the sorts of conditions that 
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must be covered. These mandates often require individuals to pay more for particular 
coverages (e.g., alcoholism, certain forms of psychiatric care) than they are worth to 
them. The mandate thus operates as an implicit tax that reduces the number of market 
transactions. On this view, deregulation should increase access by lowering price. 
 That approach of deregulation is, I think, appropriate as well on a related inquiry 
of direct relevance to this Conference volume—the perceived differential access and 
quality of care by racial group. On this question, it is possible to collect a veritable 
mountain of empirical studies that identifies disparities in the provision of health care. 
Thereafter, it is often hinted darkly that some large but indeterminate fraction of that 
difference is attributable to discrimination by health care providers, occasionally overt, 
but usually unconscious and indirect. The usual responses include stricter enforcement of 
the antidiscrimination laws, to which I shall demur in this paper. Even though it is not 
possible to review today’s vast literature on the interaction of disparities and 
discrimination in health care, it is useful to focus attention on one recent, careful, and 
comprehensive study that summarizes much of the existing literature and lends its 
support to the proposition that discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity constitutes 
a large portion of the problem.1 I refer here to the findings and conclusions that are 
contained in the massive report prepared by the Institute of Medicine (IOM): Unequal 
Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care.  
                                                 
 1There is, it should be noted, no particular claim of discrimination on grounds of sex, perhaps 
because the data reveals a consistent pattern in which a higher fraction of women have medical insurance 
than men (Bureau of the Census 2002, figure 2). Under the entry “People without Health Insurance for the 
Entire Year by Selected Characteristics: 2002,” 16.7 percent of all males, relative to 13.9 percent for all 
females were without health insurance. For those individuals under the poverty line, the figures were 33.3 
percent male uninsured versus 28.1 percent female uninsured. That difference of nearly 20 percent would 
surely draw extensive commentary if it were in the other direction. I shall ignore it here. 
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By way of background, the IOM study is unequivocal in its condemnation of the 
disparities that it does observe. At the outset “[t]he study committee defines disparities in 
health care as racial or ethnic differences in the quality of health care that are not due to 
access-related factors or clinical needs, preferences, or appropriateness of intervention” 
(IOM 2003, pp. 3–4). In this context, the IOM study gives the term “preferences” a 
narrow construction so as to exclude any preferences that are influenced by knowledge 
that members of minority groups, especially African-American, have of past 
institutionalized injustices in the United States. These injustices (for such they are) 
include both the general history of segregation, and specific instances of medical 
malfeasances of which the notorious Tuskegee experiment counts as the leading 
illustration (IOM 2003, pp. 4, 131–32). The IOM report then notes that some fraction of 
the disparity could be attributable to “[d]iscrimination that results from biases, prejudices, 
stereotyping, and uncertainty in clinical communication and decision-making” (IOM 
2003, p. 4). It then promptly injects a note of caution by observing that its definitions are 
used for the purposes of this report only, and do not count as “legal definitions” (IOM 
2003, p. 4), while stopping short of indicating what those legal definitions might require, 
and how they might differ from other definitions that could be offered. Elsewhere, it 
defines discrimination as “the differential and negative treatment of individuals on the 
basis of their race, ethnicity, gender, or other group membership” (IOM 2003, p. 95), 
without exploring how those differences arise or why they might in some cases be 
justified. The conclusions in the report are summarized in its basic recommendations. 
These include an increased awareness of the scope and sources of discrimination in 
health care by health care providers and the general public (IOM 2003, p. 6); increased 
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representation of minority health care providers among health care professionals; 
improved language communication, especially for individuals whose first language is not 
English, and increased resources for funding the enforcement of the civil rights law in 
this area. 
 The IOM report then exhaustively reviews large numbers of individual surveys 
that find differential access to certain medical procedures that are correlated with race or 
ethnic status, even after various confounding variables (age, income, location, education 
etc) are taken into account. It recognizes that some portion of this difference could be 
explained by differential patient responses to proposed treatments, but nonetheless 
concludes that this phenomenon is not likely to amount to a large effect in most settings. 
It does not refer to any of the work that points out the difficulties in dealing with the 
measurement of discrimination or argues that market forces go a long way to ameliorate 
its effects (Becker 1971; and Heckman 1998. For my endorsement of the position, see 
Epstein, 1992). 
So the question then arises, just what explanations offer the best account of any 
observed disparity. The answer, which seems ominous, is that much of that persistent 
difference is likely to be explained by residual forms of invidious discrimination that 
operate, as it were, on the subconscious level. The IOM study infers the persistence of 
discrimination in health care by noting the legion of other studies that have found 
unconscious discrimination, if not pervasive prejudice (Ayres 2001), to persist in other 
areas of life, such as employment, mortgage lending, and housing, which is said to be 
documented by the use of testers who are able to elicit differential responses, or which 
may be detected by closely examining market data involving consummated transactions. 
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 The thesis of this short article is that the leap from disparity to discrimination is 
not on balance established, even by a preponderance of the evidence. It is, of course the 
case, that some individual health care provider could have some bias against members of 
different racial or ethnic groups. But, if so, there is no particular direction to any such 
individual biases, and no evidence of any institutional forms of bias that require some 
systematic institutional response. Rather, the path to inference is rendered more uncertain 
by a variety of definitional, methodological and empirical issues that beset any systematic 
effort to identify the levels of discrimination in the provision of health care, or for that 
matter other types of services today. In particular, the IOM study devotes insufficient 
effort to give a consistent and coherent definition of discrimination. In addition, it tends 
to downplay the serious difficulties that arise from seeking to prove some form of 
discrimination either by the use of testers or the evaluation of field data, both beyond and 
within the health care area.  
Definitional Questions of Discrimination 
There are a number of important issues that bear in determining on what counts as 
discrimination. The point here is not simply one of the choice of stipulative definitions. 
The word “discrimination” carries strong negative connotations, and any individual or 
group that is found to have practiced overt and conscious discrimination is, without 
question, subject to serious legal, social, and business sanctions. These sanctions would 
remain even if the antidiscrimination laws were repealed tomorrow, which, for the sake 
of the record, is something that I have long urged, and continue to urge today (Epstein 
1992 and 1997). But no matter what the legal framework, the social importance that is 
attached to the antidiscrimination norm makes it absolutely vital that this term, and the 
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opprobrium it carries, is not falsely attached to any individual or institution. The concern 
goes not only to the inherent injustice of making false charges against the innocent, but 
also to the waste of social resources, economic and moral, that are spent in denouncing or 
correcting some nonexistent wrong. Misinformation always leads to bad decisions by 
individuals and groups, and false claims of discrimination are no exception to that general 
rule.  That particular risk is increased in light of the four factors that the IOM study lists 
together under the head of discrimination. The last two heads of analysis, uncertainty in 
clinical judgment and difficulties in communication, do not themselves seem to be forms 
of discrimination. All communications issues involve two or more persons, and the effort 
is to minimize the slips that occur in the effort to transmit information in difficult 
settings. Matters of clinical judgment often depend on good communication, so again, 
any disparity that is attributable to this factor also counts as an issue of concern, but not 
as a form of discrimination.  
 At this point, the key elements of discrimination are bias or prejudice. Both of 
these are difficult to defend since by definition they preclude the possibility of any 
justification or excuse. The case for the IOM study would be far stronger if it could offer 
documented instances of systematic overt bias and prejudice. These are rarities, in sharp 
contrast to the overt promotion of affirmative action, which is never treated as a form of 
discrimination, but as its antidote. The point here is not to attack affirmative action 
programs, especially if voluntary, but to point out that there are forms of discrimination 
that are easy to detect, even if fully justified. But invidious forms of discrimination are 
hard to find because they occur only infrequently given the costs that attach to them. All 
RAE: Dis and Dis 3/22/04 6 
sorts of horrific practices that were painfully evident fifty years ago have almost entirely 
disappeared today.  
The most elusive term in the analysis, therefore, is the bridge notion of 
“stereotyping.” In one sense, stereotype is simply one term to describe prejudice or bias 
that operates at the group or the individual level, which, once proved, allows for no 
defense. But here the definitional issues matter: do true generalizations count as 
stereotypes, even if they convey a negative impression about the group to which they 
apply? If someone says that members of group X are likely to have a higher crime rate 
than members of group Y, that statement is true even if individual x in group X has never 
committed a crime while individual y in group Y has committed a crime. It is of course 
wholly improper to use any statement about groups when it is certain that the generalized 
description in question does or does not apply to a given individual. More generally, the 
claim about bias and prejudice is that these forms of behavior are at their strongest when 
decision-makers rely on false generalizations to base future behavior, a wrong that is 
compounded when they do so with knowledge of the error. But it is much more difficult 
to attach equal, or even any, condemnation to the correct use of statistical generalizations 
in the absence of such certain information, especially when it is widely known that 
background probabilities count for a great deal in making any accurate estimation of risk 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1973 and 1974), and that some sensible heuristics might work 
well to combine background with case information (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). 
There is a great willingness to combine background information (about the 
frequency of blue and yellow buses on a particular route) with specific information (what 
someone recalls to be the color of this bus) in dealing with ordinary questions of 
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evidence. It therefore requires at least some pause before that strategy of compound 
identification is condemned when the background information contains a race variable. 
When Jesse Jackson states that he is more worried when tailed by a black man than a 
white man at night, he is making rational statements about risk, and about the benefits of 
taking evasive action. The same is true of a cab driver of whatever race who is uneasy 
about taking a wholly respectable passenger into a dangerous black neighborhood: the 
risks of adverse consequences are not wholly dependent on what the passenger does, but 
on the conduct of potential criminals who cannot be observed at the outset of the 
transaction, or even the inability to get a return fare to offset some portion of the cost 
count as reasons to discriminate that no market will dissipate. It may be regrettable that 
Jesse Jackson or the ordinary cab driver (has to) feel that way, but it hardly counts as an 
unjustified prejudice for this negative treatment if it responds to economic costs that are 
real. No one would question the use of that information to choose between individuals of 
the same race; why then, if the information is reliable, does it become morally necessary 
(without the benefit of argument) to rule these behaviors out of bounds? The IOM study 
thus cuts too broadly in its definition of discrimination because it forecloses any debate 
over possible justifications for any observed negative treatment. The easy elision of 
prejudice and stereotyping skews the fundamental inquiry. 
 In order to see the full complexity of this definitional issue, it is useful to note that 
the original purpose of the civil rights laws was to remove what their supporters counted 
as the irrational use of race in making decisions. The basic expectation was that the 
elimination of discrimination would result in more efficient markets because of the 
removal of extraneous factors. Typical of the general observations is this: “Under Title 
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VII, employment will be on the basis of merit, not race” (Cong. Rec. p. 1600, statement 
of Congressman Joseph Minish). The last objective that anyone defended early on was 
that the introduction of an antidiscrimination law would introduce any element of subsidy 
in favor of members of any group. Yet just that can happen by using definitions that 
knock out statistical information because of its disparate impact on grounds of race.  
The point here—that discrimination laws can create implicit cross-subsidies—is 
of major significance, for all forms of insurance necessarily rely on group characteristics 
as signals for the occurrence of some future, uncertain, and insurable event. It is of course 
possible by law to ban the use of explicit racial classifications in dealing with insurance, 
and I know of no major corporation that would ever risk the incorporation of an explicit 
race variable into its rate structure no matter what the legal rules provided: the public ill 
will would be too difficult to withstand. But risk classifications have to depend on some 
variables, and it is hard to justify any conclusion that an insurer has behaved out of bias 
and prejudice when it allows rates to vary on these factors. The willingness to condemn 
accurate statistical behavior as a form of stereotyping impinges on the ability to use 
reliable race-neutral proxies (e.g., home address or college boards) that are in fact 
correlated with race because of their disparate impact. More concretely, the sketchy IOM 
study treatment of discrimination perpetuates a major ambiguity into equation, because 
there are in fact two quite distinct treatments of discrimination—one economic and the 
other legal—that have been at work in this area.  
 The standard economic treatment of discrimination starts with the notion that 
there are different prices that are charged for (what appears to be) the same product. In 
general, economic theory predicts a convergence toward a single price for one product, so 
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that some explanation has to be offered to account for the observed disparities. The first 
explanation is that what appears to be discrimination is in fact not, for the two items 
differ in some relevant particular that affects the cost of its provision. The most common 
example is the provision of kilowatt electricity at off-peak and peak periods. Off-peak 
electricity is far cheaper to supply because the equipment can be run cheaply and 
efficiently. Once the output demanded starts to expand, the additional costs per unit 
increase, which is why peak-load pricing is a staple of rate regulation. But even in a pure 
competitive industry, the differences in the cost of production will always translate into a 
difference in price. New entrants will bid down the price of the cheap electricity, and exit 
from the market will lead to a rise in the price of expensive electricity. Any differences in 
price that track differences in cost do not give rise to any potential economic 
misallocation. 
 The analysis gets more difficult when the discrimination in the observed prices is 
not tied to underlying costs, but is a function of the differential demand of various buyers. 
This demand-driven discrimination cannot arise in a competitive market, for the moment 
any seller tries to raise his price, someone else will either enter the market or expand 
output to bring the price back down again. It is only in a system where a seller has 
monopoly prices (and the first buyer cannot resell to the second) that demand-side price 
discrimination is possible. In essence, the clever monopolist who knows about 
differential demand will charge the higher demanders more than the lower ones. It is, 
however, far from clear whether this differential pricing should be regarded as a good or 
bad thing. Without the discrimination, the low demanders would be forced to abandon the 
market if they could not pay the (single) monopoly price; in practice this form of price 
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discrimination allows more buyers to remain in the market. In the limit, where perfect 
price discrimination is possible, we have the exact same output that we have under 
perfect competition, because every buyer in the competitive market still remains. But 
there is this one key difference: all the net social gains from production go to the 
monopolist while under competition they all go to the buyers of the goods. 
 Nonetheless, there are difficulties with the price discrimination practiced by 
monopolists. First, the ability to estimate demand for individual consumers or groups of 
consumers is far from perfect. Price discrimination, therefore, absorbs higher transaction 
costs than pure competition, which in turn drives down consumer welfare. In addition, 
any imperfect form of price discrimination still excludes some buyers from the market. 
These considerations are sufficient to explain the general preference for competition over 
monopoly, but do not resolve the harder question whether monopoly with price 
discrimination is better, or worse, than without it. For these purposes it is sufficient to 
note that various forms of discrimination that rely on arbitrary qualities, such as race, sex, 
or age, are generally frowned upon: the sentiment is that two people with the same 
reservation price (i.e., maximum willingness to pay) should pay the same actual price. 
That judgment is not iron-clad, but for these purposes, we can accept this point: under the 
current law, any form of demand-driven discrimination based on race should be regarded 
as illegal. 
 These two forms of discrimination present serious problems for any rate-making 
process. One objective is to make sure that differences in cost are respected in setting the 
rates, so as to avoid the creation of any cross subsidies between different classes of 
consumers. In accordance with that view, price differences should be keyed to the cost of 
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providing services to particular groups. Improper price discrimination occurs when the 
members of one group are forced to bear the costs associated with the provision of 
service to the other. In this context, any formula or test is nondiscriminatory if it offers all 
individuals in either group an equal rate of return on any investment that they make. One 
consequence of this definition is that the rates charged for any given person do not 
depend on the existence or nonexistence of that second group.  
For example, in the insurance market, if the only covered individuals were 
members of group A with a premium that averages $100 per person, then that average 
rate should not go up or down because of the introduction into the mix of group B with an 
average premium of $150 (or $50) per person. The median rates in both settings should 
remain the same, as should the variation across members in the group, as determined by 
any nonracial variables that might have predictive value. The basic rate structure allows 
the firm to obtain a normal rate of return from its investment from the customers in group 
A, and gives all individual members the same expected return on their premium. In a 
market economy, the arrival of a second group does not lead to any change in the 
premium structure for the members of the first one.2 Stated generally, the rates that 
should be charged to white and black persons should not vary with the arrival or 
disappearance with the other group. Given these stabilizing tendencies, any legal 
requirement to charge a blended rate of $125 (or $75) creates an implicit subsidy for 
members of one group or the other. Those individuals who are subsidized will engage in 
too much dangerous activity. Those who pay the subsidy will engage in too little. Either 
                                                 
 2Here I ignore the complications that arise if there are any economies of scale that allow for a 
reduction in the amount of fixed costs that would be allocable to any individual customer.  
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way there is a resource distortion that more accurate pricing could avoid. It follows that 
when the cost of service is different, charging identical rates is an economic form of price 
discrimination that leads to resource misallocation: too many high risk people are in the 
market, and some low-risk people are driven out. 
 The common legal definition of discrimination unfortunately works at cross-
purposes with this economic account. Here the argument is one that stresses formal 
equality between members of two different groups, regardless of the incidence and 
distribution of actual losses. Some years ago I worked on a case in which the charge of 
discrimination was that the insurance rates in predominantly black neighborhoods were 
discriminatorily high because the identical coverage (expressed in terms of property 
value, limits, deductibles, period of coverage, etc.) was higher than it was in a nearby 
white neighborhood. The factual basis of this charge is easy to make out, because one 
need only compare the rates in the two areas. But the economic definition of 
discrimination requires that one examine the relationship between loss experience and 
rates, which is also easy to do at the end of the policy periods. In the cases at hand, the 
premiums charged in the predominantly black neighborhood were not sufficient to cover 
the losses in question, while those charged in the predominantly white neighborhood 
were more than sufficient to cover the losses in question. Stated otherwise, the insurance 
market was not stable in the predominantly black areas owing to the net losses, which in 
turn suggested exit from the area, which would be accompanied by an inflow of capital 
into the white neighborhoods. The contrast could not be starker. This one set of facts 
provides conclusive proof of two antithetical forms of discrimination: the economic 
account finds discrimination in favor of residents in the predominantly black 
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neighborhood, and the legal account finds against it. When it is said that markets will not 
stop discrimination (Sunstein 1991), the charge is manifestly true if the so-called legal 
definition of discrimination is used, but in all likelihood false if the economic definition 
is used. The persistence of real cost differences between groups will keep unregulated 
firms from charging identical rates no matter whether market is competitive or 
monopolist in structure. In the insurance case mentioned, the reason why the market did 
not equilibrate in accordance with the underlying losses was doubtless because of the fear 
of severe legal response through regulation or litigation if the economic differences were 
not muted. There is no question that various types of measures (e.g., assigned risk pools) 
can introduce a major extent of cross-subsidy in insurance markets if allowed to operate. 
They can also lead to major bankruptcies is allowed to run on indefinitely (Epstein 1991). 
Some Empirical Evidence 
This choice between competing definitions helps explains much of the data found in 
dealing with these issues in multiple contexts. Here I shall briefly discuss some of the 
arguments that have been used to identify pervasive levels of discrimination in various 
nonhealth care markets.  
 Employment markets are one such area, and there have been studies that have 
claimed extensive prejudice in their operation. One study by Claudia Goldin and Cecilia 
Rouse (2000) reported that women in highly competitive auditions for orchestral 
positions improved their success rate relative to men once the standard viewed auditions 
were replaced by blind auditions, which required all applicants to perform from behind a 
curtain. I have no reason to quarrel with the data, but question the implications. This 
change in procedure was adopted by the orchestra itself, which offers some evidence that 
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markets are capable of self-correction once some unfairness is pointed out. Second, the 
blind audition process (in unionized orchestras) covers initial stages, and not the final 
round before the conductor and the final selection committee. And for good reason: 
something is lost about the dynamics of an orchestra, which depends in part on 
interactions and appearance. Third, the study does give a full account of the entire range 
of hiring practices. Blind auditions are consistent with affirmative action programs that 
recruit women candidates for auditions in the first place. Do those who believe that there 
is pervasive discrimination against women deny the power of affirmative action programs 
in virtually all aspects of higher education? Or assume that the scores in science and math 
for women at select institutions are indistinguishable from those of men? To admit the 
truth of these statements is not to condemn the practices in question, for even if some 
conscious discrimination is present, the issue of whether it is justified (on the grounds of 
a superior student or workplace mix) is still open. Contrary to what the defenders of the 
civil rights laws thought, “merit” is not exclusively an individual concept, but one that 
rests in large measure on the “fit” that individual workers have with the team of which 
they are a part (Collins 2001, pp. XXX). But no matter how one comes out on this, any 
overall assessment of this issue cannot treat the affirmative action question as though it 
were wholly separate from the discrimination issue, when in fact they are opposite sides 
of the same coin. 
 Further evidence of “pervasive prejudice has been advanced chiefly by Ian Ayres, 
on the proof of “pervasive prejudice” in various automobile selling and lending markets 
(Ayres 1991). Some years ago Ayres published a number of highly visible studies that 
purported to document through the use of testers persistent discrimination in the level of 
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markup that dealers charged customers for new automobiles,3 concluding that there is, to 
use his phrase, pervasive prejudice in a wide range of important markets, such as 
automobiles and housing, that allow for any variation in price. Since that time he has 
done further work with actual sales data in order to prove the identical point. His 
numbers, which I will take as wholly accurate, indicate that black drivers of both sexes 
pay somewhat higher rates than white drivers for the same kind of automobile. The 
implicit subtext of his argument is that there are no cost differences to the provision of 
the automobiles in the two areas, so that any price differential is attributable as a form of 
pervasive prejudice. The source and depth of this prejudice is somewhat obscure, and 
may not rest on associational dislikes, i.e., by people who don’t like to be around black 
persons. “For example, if sellers enjoy extracting an extra dollar of profit from people of 
color more than from whites, we might expect to see disparate racial treatment in pricing 
or quality of service” (Ayres 2001, p. 4). One could question which “sellers” fit this 
description, or why there are no sellers who find similar pleasure in milking their white 
customers. Even so, this form of prejudice is treated as extraordinarily tenacious. In 
contrast to the standard economic accounts of discrimination, these differences persist 
strongly over time in highly competitive markets, and are not eroded by new entry or 
customer strategies of shifting from less to more desirable dealerships. In his view, these 
differentials represent a general pattern of unconscious stereotyping similar to that which 
the IOM study found in connection with the provision of health care. 
 Ayres’s conclusions are at war with the standard economic account of 
discrimination. This account does not assume that all individuals are interested only in 
                                                 
 3Harv. L. Rev.    (1988); Mich. L. Rev. [author, article?] 
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money. Rather, it assumes that if the real costs are identical, as Ayres postulates them to 
be, then some sellers will be prepared to undercut the market because all dealers do not 
suffer from the uniform degrees of latent or sadistic prejudice. The behavior of the 
market is not defined by how the majority of dealers respond to racial differences in their 
customers. It responds to how those individual dealers who are most sympathetic to black 
customers view the situation. If Ayres’s assumptions and data are both correct, then the 
traditional theory has suffered a decisive refutation, with no replacement in sight. 
 In principle, we should be very reluctant to abandon theories that seem to fall 
within the orthodox assumptions of economic theory. Instead we should test whether the 
initial set of assumptions, relating to constant cost of services and product are in fact 
accurate. On this point, Ayres is correct to note that the sale of an automobile is in part a 
“relational contract,” which means that the relationship between the parties continues 
after the time of sale (Ayres 2001, p. 4). He uses this information to note that the 
variations that are introduced could allow the sales representative the opportunity to 
extract some additional unit of profit from black customers (Ayres 2001, p. 21). But the 
relational aspects of the transaction have other consequences as well, namely, introducing 
a possible variation in the cost structure of dealing with different customer groups, that is, 
a set of unobserved variables that escape the analyst, but influence the behavior of the 
decisionmaker.4 At this point, it is no longer necessary to postulate massive levels of 
undetected prejudice, for sales transactions, as Ayres recognizes (Ayres 2001, p. 4) are 
not simple one shot deals, but the opening chapter in ongoing relationships between 
                                                 
 4On the difficulty of dealing with these in connection with audit tests, see Heckman 1998, pp. 
107–11. 
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dealers and customers. If these relationships are more costly to continue with black 
customers than with white customers (because delivery is more costly, or service calls are 
more frequent, or if higher default rates require dealer time), then we should expect to see 
some price differential to persist for the reason noted above: cost-based forms of 
discrimination are never eliminated by market pressures no matter how free new entry. I 
have not done any detailed study on how these automobile markets work, but at the very 
least the situation seems to be this: we could either have some unidentified cost 
difference or some unidentified form of prejudice that drives the model. The former of 
these is perfectly consistent with basic economic theory. The latter reminds us of the 
unobservable ether that was unable to save Newtonian mechanics. 
 The question then arises on how to choose between these two programs. Here are 
some reasons why we should go with the cost explanation. Audit studies require the 
investigators to prepare the tests. Often that preparation is done by individuals who have 
a strong conviction that discrimination will be found. That could easily lead the testers to 
alter behavior in subtle ways that bring about the desired results. Double blind studies are 
surely preferable, but exceedingly difficult to do in this area. Second, we have so few 
instances of overt discrimination in any of these cases. One reason perhaps is that 
particular evidence of this sort does not prove pervasive discrimination because it is 
confined to a small number of circumstances. Yet, by the same token, it is exceedingly 
odd that some form of prejudice could lie just below the surface and never manifest itself 
in concrete cases. Yet the absence of those instances is consistent with the theory of cost-
based discrimination because we should expect all vendors to adapt the same strategy 
regardless of their own race because they all face the same set of customers. Ironically, 
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Ayres supplies us with a tidbit of evidence in this direction when he notes that the same 
pricing practices appear to take place among different customer groups even when all the 
sales personnel are black (Ayres 2001, p. 107, note 33). At this point we should expect 
group favoritism to run in the opposite direction to extent that any race-neutral theory of 
prejudice stresses the in-group, out-group distinction. Yet none occurs, which offers at 
least some evidence that profit motivations do matter. At this point, it is important to note 
that under current law, these distinctions may not matter because differential treatment 
based on differential costs of service, if correlated with race, is regarded as illegal under 
the so-called disparate impact theories that control in this area. The choice of definitions 
matter, because the current law treats rational conduct as though it were a form of 
bigotry. 
 The efforts to prove discrimination in new car sales have some plausibility 
because the sales persons have to enter into direct contact with ordinary individuals 
whose race and sex is evident from the outset. The associational dislike stories cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. But if statistical analysis is allowed to control the search for 
discrimination, then the same techniques could be extended to cases where there is no 
contact whatsoever between the parties. On this point, Ayres and I were expert witnesses 
on the opposite side of at least one case in which the charge for discrimination arose out 
of the practices associated with the financing of automobiles (Cason v. Nissan Motors 
Acceptance Corp.  F.3d   (6th Cir. 200X)). In these cases, brought for violations of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act [citation], the typical transaction arises when the purchaser 
of an automobile decides to purchase the car on credit from a dealer. The dealer then 
offers a loan at a set annual percentage rate (APR). The disclosure of relevant loan terms 
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is regulated by the standard truth-in-lending statute. Once the loan has been negotiated, 
then the dealer sells the commercial paper to anyone of a number of competing firms who 
pay it a fee for originating the loan. The “acceptance corporation,” such as Nissan Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (NMAC), makes no direct loans to customers. Before it decides 
to buy dealer paper, it runs an elaborate program on key demographic data in order to 
make its decision. For the loans that it wishes to “accept,” it offers the dealer a fee, called 
the “mark-up, so that it receives a lower yield from the transaction, known as the “buy 
rate.” The key relationship between these variables is as follows: 
 
  Buy rate + mark up = Annual percentage rate 
 
At no stage in the process is there any personal contact between the acceptance 
corporation and the dealer’s customer; nor can the acceptance corporation infer the race 
of the customer from the transaction, so much so that there was major difficulty in 
litigation in trying to sort people (by zip code, for example) into white and black in order 
to find out who was in the plaintiff class. Any effort to show that these cases involve 
unconscious prejudice is negated by the institutional safeguards involved. It is also 
accepted that two identical applicants (and remember here there is no background 
knowledge to control for) receive the identical mark-ups regardless of race. The built-in 
institutional arrangements make these financing arrangements the laboratory illustration 
of a prejudice-free transaction. Yet the law suits in question all allege that all these 
transactions discriminate against black customers because as a group their loans are 
subject to higher mark-ups than loans to white customers. That difference is attributable 
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to the then-standard industry practice of paying higher markups for high-risk loans than 
for low-risk loans. Since disparate treatment is out of the question, the only question is 
whether or not that differential has a disparate impact that violates the antidiscrimination 
law , when it is conceded that all interest rate differentials reflect the difference in credit 
risks.  
 In principle, the first concern should be whether to allow disparate impact cases 
(without any evidence of intention) in cases of race-blind financing. I do not think that 
this is appropriate, even for those who believe that the antidiscrimination law has a place 
to play in employment transactions where the (too) stringent rules in effect allow only 
those employment practices justified by some “business necessity” for which no narrower 
employment practice is available (Ayres 2004). This test lags because it never makes it 
clear what kind of necessity has to be shown to justify any particular employment 
practice. There are empirically an infinite array of variations, so that some practices that 
have some disparate impact are also somewhat more efficient. Just how these tradeoffs 
work in litigation is anyone’s guess, even today after over thirty years of experience with 
this or that version of the standard. Unfortunately, the only fixed point in this analysis is 
that any high level of judicial scrutiny cuts deep into ordinary management prerogatives, 
even if they reach only practices that pose little risk of social mischief. The original 
rationale for allowing the use of statistical evidence in employment cases was that the 
clever employer intent on discrimination (a more plausible construct in 1965 than today) 
could hide his intentions behind a set of pretexts that only solid statistical evidence could 
pierce. But here the institutional arrangements preclude the use of pretextual devices, so 
that there are no cases of submerged, invidious discrimination left to expose. That said, 
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the chief result of the disparate impact case is to hypothesize pervasive discrimination in 
what everyone acknowledges to be an intensively competitive environment in which no 
lender has more than a sliver of the relevant market.  
 The only way to establish a legal case of discrimination is to assume that the 
differential markups reflect a practice of discrimination. But immediately the objection 
arises, why would finance company pay a dealer anything extra for work that was not 
undertaken? The much more likely explanation is that the charges involved here vary 
with the costs needed to place more difficult loans. Thus, a dealer might have to place 
multiple phone calls to different lenders to persuade them to take a risky customer. In 
addition, the system of payment from dealers only takes place on completed transactions, 
and thus has to cover the costs of those loan transactions that fail entirely even after 
dealer efforts. To make this case of discrimination work, it would be necessary to 
understand in detail the relevant cost functions, but these were never explored in any 
detail in the case. Rather, it was just postulated that the costs did not follow the markups 
so that discrimination had to be the cause. In a sense, these finance cases are the 
reduction ad absurdum of the dealer selling cases: better to postulate some hidden 
prejudice than treat the observed set of rates as the process of an impersonal set of market 
transactions, which these cases undoubtedly were. 
Application in Medical Areas 
I have spent this time examining the use of discrimination in other areas to show that one 
has to take with a grain of salt the IOM claims that pervasive prejudice should be treated 
as an established norm in other industries. But it is clear that these techniques to prove 
discrimination, however shaky, can be used in this context as well. Once again Ayres and 
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his colleagues have taken the lead in arguing that the traditional guidelines for organ 
transplantation, with their emphasis on antigen matches, had a disparate impact in 
practice even though they were neutral in form. The observation that black candidates for 
kidney transplants, for example, had longer queuing times than white candidates fueled 
some changes in UNOS protocols for organ allocation.  
 In one sense this program is unexceptionable. If it turns out that anything less that 
a perfect antigen match has no predictive value on how long individuals will survive 
upon receipt of a kidney, then that factor should be disregarded on the simple ground that 
in an administrative system (which treats voluntary purchase as a criminal act) the only 
intelligible objective is to maximize the present discounted value of future years of life 
saved, adjusted for quality of life considerations. At this point, the only question that one 
has to ask in order to compare two different protocols is which one produces the larger 
net saving for the organs so distributed. In one sense, this inquiry can be run without 
regard to race by seeking to identify those neutral variables (including time on a waiting 
list) that determine the organ allocation. On this view, or rephrase “the distribution of 
organs between white and black recipients is utterly immaterial on the ground that each 
counts for one and only one.  
The hard question is whether the newer system or older system of allocation 
better achieves this particular goal. It does not, however, follow that race is irrelevant to 
the overall inquiry because the relevant question is not how long will people survive with 
a transplant, but how much longer they would survive with a transplant than on dialysis. 
Thus if two persons each could live five years with a transplant, and one could live only 
one year without it, and the other four years without it, then, all other things being equal, 
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give the kidney to the former, at least in the absence of any market test. Therefore, if race 
is, either way, a determinant of receptivity to dialysis, it should be taken into account in 
service of the neutral end. At most, race (or randomization) would be a decider only 
when there is no difference on the strength of any medical criterion. Whether the new 
UNOS rules meet this test is for others to determine. What matters for this analysis is the 
criterion: greatest net lives saved per organ. If, for example, alcoholism was negatively 
correlated with transplant success, and positively correlated with race, it should be fit into 
the analysis even under a disparate impact regime.  
 The question of discrimination also surfaces in connection with standardized 
provision of health care. In this context, the usual market forces are often consciously 
overridden, because the extensive set of health care services provided through 
government agencies is not meant to replicate the market in that it tolerates a good deal of 
cross subsidy. In dealing with these subsidies, it should be noted that in most relevant 
classes of medical treatment, the incidence of illnesses within the black population is 
higher than that found within the white population (IOM 2003, 81–87) There are 
significant differences in the frequency of diseases of the heart, cerebrovascular diseases, 
malignant neoplasms, and diabetes, across these groups. The bottom line is this: “The 
mortality rate for African Americans is approximately 1.6 times higher than that for 
whites—a ratio that is identical to the black/white mortality ratio in 1950.” (IOM, at 
82)—which of course implies a greater absolute percentage reduction in black mortality 
relative to white. A quick look at these figures is against a background in which race is 
not used as a marker in the provision of health care, such that the present system involves 
a substantial net wealth transfer from white to black individuals, which undercuts any 
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claim of global discrimination against blacks who have been the net recipients under 
current government policy. It is, however, some evidence of the predisposition of the 
IOM drafters that the neutral racial policies that produce this result are not so much as 
mentioned, even though the adverse effects that neutral policies on members of various 
minority groups, as in organ transplantation, is a staple of the modern literature. 
 The question then is what to make of the persistent findings of differential 
treatment that are reported in these areas. Here one lesson that could be learned, but is 
not, is that it is important to understand the detailed industry judgments before making 
any inferences about discrimination. In medical services, cost is often not the relevant 
variable, so that the determinants of medical choices are harder to find. As noted, the 
IOM report lumps together the questions of clinical uncertainty and communication 
breakdown with bias and prejudice in dealing with discrimination. Yet there is good 
reason why this should not be so. The failures that occur in these instances are not the 
result of ill-motive or insensitive behavior. The breakdowns in the system, and these are 
numerous, are problems of management that everyone should try to eliminate, but not the 
source of some deep-seated structural failure. 
 The question then arises, just how pervasive these failures could be. Given the 
observed differences in the treated populations, they could be every bit as pervasive as 
the alleged discrimination in health care. Here are some possibilities that could be taken 
into account, but often are not. The conscientious physician does not treat any medical 
condition in isolation. It is critical to know something of the capabilities of the patient 
and the surrounding support structure from family and friends. Thus assume that we have 
a situation in which the choice is between a simple procedure with modest returns and a 
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complex procedure with higher returns but greater risk. The same physician might be 
well advised to recommend the former procedure to patients with less sophistication and 
weak support services, and the latter procedure to individuals with high awareness and 
strong support procedures. As with general efforts to prove discrimination, the number of 
variables that can be included in any regression are far fewer than those which can be 
taken into account in dealing with the case, whether we deal with automobile sales 
representatives or physicians. In the treatment of any particular case, that judgment will 
be based on the treating physician’s close personal assessment of the individuals in 
question and will not turn on the only variables that outside analysts can use: age, 
income, years of education, etc. At this point, it could well be that recommending 
differential treatments represents the correct clinical judgments. If, as often happens, the 
coherence of family and support structures do vary by race, then, rightly understood, 
differences of this sort, if systematically replicated, are evidence of fair treatment across 
the board. Once again, if these differences do exist, then no amount of sensitivity training 
would, or should, eliminate them. And any litigation effort to insure uniform treatment 
would have the perverse effect of making medical care more dangerous to all patients. 
 The question then is how does one get the relevant information on the variables 
that count in individual cases. Large utilization studies are not likely to produce the right 
sort of results because if these variables of self-sufficiency and social support networks 
are operative in some cases, they could easily be operative in all, which means that 
supposed evidence of pervasive discrimination is in reality evidence of conscientious 
efforts to tailor the treatment to the patient, not the statistical category. How then can we 
tell whether the difference is to be treated as good or bad? Once again it is necessary to 
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have recourse to another theme from the general discrimination literature. It seems very 
odd that latent prejudices will simmer just below the surface and never manifest 
themselves in visible forms of antisocial behavior. The case for pervasive discrimination 
seems still weaker since virtually every writer on discrimination in health care (Satel 
2004) thumpingly deplores the discrimination that they detect in their studies, and that the 
entire profession has set its public face against any form of discrimination in the 
provision of health care with a set of social norms that are so thick that you can cut them 
with a knife. There are, in addition, instructive anecdotes about individual physicians 
who sense a breakdown in communication and then take proactive steps to correct them. 
Sally Satel’s brief account of how poor patients, often people of color, do not know the 
difference between a simple swab for bacterial infection from a Pap smear for cancer is 
but one illustration of the barriers that have to be overcome in the provision of routine 
clinical care. Greggory Bloche’s (2004) study of communication is yet another effort to 
break down the process in order to isolate the potential sources of failure. 
 It seems clear that most of the tangible gains that could be achieved in health care 
under the current system lie in making everyone more sensitive to these communications 
glitches. But if that is the case, then we should be deeply troubled by the IOM study’s 
eagerness to find (illicit) discrimination as the source of the various difficulties in dealing 
with today’s health care problems. Indeed, the constant criticisms of the current system 
for its untoward biases have bad short-term consequences, when measured in flesh-and-
blood terms. One public source of concern is the unwillingness of minority individuals to 
use the health care system because they think that it is stacked against them. If that 
charge were indeed true, then the decision by members of disadvantaged groups to keep 
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out is rational: people will make less use of a system that promises them fewer benefits. 
But now think of how things look if it turns out that the claims of illicit discrimination are 
overplayed. At this point, the net effect is to give false information to potential users of 
the legal system, which is likely to keep them out of a health care system that is far more 
sympathetic to their claims that the received wisdom allows. That reluctance to work 
within the system in turn translates itself into lower levels of care and high risks of 
mortality and morbidity. I would not want that sequence of events to rest on my 
shoulders.  
The IOM study adopts exactly the wrong approach when it lends its sympathetic 
ear to the critics of the current system. I would write the exact opposite report. Instead of 
dwelling on the Tuskegee experiments as evidence of current biases that linger within the 
system, I would trumpet the dedicated men and women in the profession who are 
determined to help people of all backgrounds and races deal with their health problems. I 
would stress that the attitudes of physicians today have shown a true revolution from 
those that permeated the generation or two ago; that the influx of physicians from all 
races and all walks of life has transformed the internal culture, so that wary customers 
should have confidence in the incredible dedication that young physicians, in particular 
show, notwithstanding their long hours and low pay. Truth is, this seems like the more 
accurate summary of the available evidence. It is a shame to attack so many people of 
good will on evidence that admits a much more benign interpretation. And it would be a 
shame to lose lives because of a determined effort to make things appear worse than they 
really are. There are better ways to spend money to improve health. And there are enough 
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problems in the health care system even without the genteel guilt trip that pervades the 
IOM study. 
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